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Abstract
Socio-economists such as Peter Drucker and Alvin Toffler have
called our attention to the importance of knowledge as a management
resource and as power. This issue, however, raises question of how knowl-
edge can be creative, or better, how knowledge creation can be pro-
duced in a company? This article is intended to provide a philosophical
analysis of the creative dimension of human knowledge. Following the
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thought of Michael Polanyi who proposes the thesis that all knowledge is
based on personal or tacit elements, this article suggests the idea that
business is not a neutral and objective activity. To be creative, it must be
arranged as a social activity that has a relationship to cultural tradition.
From the perspective of tacit knowing, business is our way of being. We
still always dwell in our cultural tradition in doing business.
1.  Introduction
Michael Polanyi’s theory of tacit knowing has been considered at
large in many areas: science, economics, and business. For people who
dwell in these areas, Personal Knowledge (1958) and The Tacit Di-
mension (1966) are not only philosophical books but also the alternative
sources to understand science, human knowledge in general, and organi-
zational knowledge creation. Especially his explanation of creative dimen-
sion of human knowledge can be helpful to understand the capability of a
company as a whole to create new knowledge, to disseminate it through-
out the organization, and to embody it in products, services, and systems.
This tone of its relevance in the organizational knowledge creation has
been introduced for the first time by Ikujiro Nonaka and Hirotaka Tekeuchi
in their book entitled The Knowledge-Creating Company in 1995.1  The
book is a scientific report of their research on the success of Japanese
companies in the 1970s and 1980s. Started with the assumption that
knowledge creation is the source of the highest-quality power and the key
to powershift - as a translation of Western idiom “knowledge as power”
__ Nonaka and Takeuchi reach the conclusion that the great success of
Japanese companies in the 1970s and 1980s depends on how the man-
agement staffs and the workers dwell into the vision of company, their
commitment to company's problem, and their immersion into the company’s
tradition. All these are tacit dimension in knowledge creation.2
In the course of this study the tacit dimension is not just a fact in
human knowledge and knowledge management but also has its function in
the creative process in knowledge management. Regarding this contribu-
tion, scholars in organizational knowledge creation try to understand the
secret of tacit knowing with which the philosophers are concerned. This
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paper aims to introduce the meaning of tacit knowing and then tries to
examine its relevance for organizational knowledge creation. For this pur-
pose, this paper will divide this topic into two stages. At the first stage the
paper will take a look at the question how Michael Polanyi explains his
theory of tacit knowing and at the second stage it will try to find out its
implications in the knowledge creation in business.
2.  Michael Polanyi, a Philosopher
Michael Polanyi was born on March 11, 1891 in the talented and
intellectual family of Mihaly Pollacsek and Cecilia Wohl, in Budapest,
Hungary. His father was born between 1825 and 1830 in a small Jewish
settlement in the Hungarian mountains and, after participating in a Hungar-
ian revolt against the Habsburgs in 1848, he escaped to Switzerland where
he studied engineering.3  The mother was an anarchist Russian countess,
who had also fled to Switzerland in the aftermath of a bomb plot (for
which she had built the bomb in the chemistry laboratory of the Czar’s
School for Daughters of the Nobility).
Michael Polanyi had three brothers and one sister. The eldest
brother was Otto, who in the 1920s became a major industrialist in Italy,
where he changed his name to Otto Pol. Otto was known as a Marxist
and a financial backer of the socialist newspaper Avanti, of which Mussolini
was the editor. The next brother in age was Adolph who had emigrated to
Brazil, where he found an interracial society in which whites, blacks, and
Indians would meld into a new civilization __ modern yet tribal, free yet not
individualist. After Otto and Adolph came Michael’s sister, Mousie or
Laura, who around 1900, at the age of nineteen became a leader in the
Hungarian folk movement. The sister had an artistic side (Bartok and
Dohnanyi) as well as a political and social vision of a life centered in the
communal village. Mousie Polanyi was the editor of a magazine for this
movement and through this organ helped to define and direct it.
Between Laura and Michael in age came Karl who was the first
President of The Galilei Circle at the University of Budapest4 and eventu-
ally became a professor of history of economics at Bennington and Co-
lumbia University in 1946. After World War I, he edited the Austrian
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Economist in Vienna and lived in poverty while giving most of his income
to the relief of Hungarian refugees. Karl is now best known for his study
of the social and cultural effects of the rise of capitalist market economies
through his book The Great Transformation, which had been drafted in
1940 and was published in New York in 1944 and in London in 1945.5
Karl is known because of his criticism of the extensive application of the
market system and its law of supply and demand of goods and capital.
One of his central arguments is that if this system is applied to land and
labor, then the result is that people come to be considered as commodities
with a purely economic value. For Karl, the market system violently dis-
torts our views of man and of society. And to counteract this dehumaniz-
ing tendency, Karl advocates redistribution of wealth and reciprocity of
commitments and obligation according to social and political rather than
economic norms.
If Karl, like Otto and Laura, defined himself as a socialist, Michael
was looking for an alternative style of life, which he later calls in the Per-
sonal Knowledge, ‘the responsible person’.6 At first he was concerned
with the problem of society and social processes. He tries to find his own
way between a bourgeois capitalism that rejects the intervention of com-
munity in the individual life and a Marxist socialism that denies the indi-
vidual freedom and the claim to be an independent person. Opposing the
rationalism of the traditional ‘Liberal’ and anti-human collectivism of the
Socialist and Marxist, he builds up his own concept of man and social
processes under the formulation: “the freedom of the subjective person to
do as he pleases is overruled by the freedom of the responsible person to
act as he must”.7  With this position of a responsible person, he defends in
his writings the political and social implications of science with a genuine
intelligence and thereby opens a clearer path for the life of reason and
justice. To look for a solution to the problems that existed in his and his
father’s generations, he holds that only in co-operation with others in the
development of understanding and in responsible action can the full devel-
opment of human personhood take place.8
This difference between the socialism of his siblings and his own
responsible personalism which sought justice and freedom, resulted in
tensions within the family. One of these is that the relation between Michael
and Karl became very cool.9 At first, the brothers were brought up with
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the same world view. Both were members of The Galilei Circle and in this
circle both brothers shared the same ideas: they were free in spirit and
anti-materialist. By the end of the 1920s, both had moved from free-
thinking atheism to Tolstoyan Christianity based on the view that indi-
vidual self-completion could be the impetus for social change. Here, at
this period, however, the brothers began to diverge. While Karl took a
definite step beyond individualist ethics towards the societal one, and tried
to imbue sociology with moral imperatives, influenced by Kant’s categori-
cal imperatives and by Christianity, Michael seemed to keep insisting upon
the anti-materialist world view and shifted towards a theoretical philoso-
phy in which the theory of knowledge dominated the theory of society.
From here on, the brothers took divergent directions. Karl became a
socialist or more precisely a social democrat, while Michael, with his deep
understanding of the personal and social dimension of man, from the be-
ginning of his career as scientist and philosopher, engaged in a criticism of
Marxism.
The year 1935 marked the critical stage in the relationship when
Michael criticised USSR Economic policy in his essay, “USSR Econom-
ics - Fundamental Data, System and Spirit” which he wrote when we was
in the Manchester School of Economics and Social Studies.10 Karl ac-
cused Michael of not understanding social and economic problems and
contended that the working-class must be a starting point in Russia for the
sake of socialism.11  Thus, from their former common ground of Tolstoyan
religiosity, Karl had moved towards a community-oriented Christian soci-
ology which led him to celebrate the Russian experiment as the sole em-
bodiment of socialism, while Michael rejected it and went on to construct
a social theory based upon a theory of knowledge and of free society.
Accordingly, for Michael fascism was not a genuine monster in the twen-
tieth century, but only a consequence of Marxism.
But the cool relationship in the family did not last forever. In the
end, Karl knew that Michael was right. The Hungarian revolution in 1956
was the moment. Karl began to criticise Russian power politics; and the
emphasis he placed on moral considerations as a motive for the Hungar-
ian revolution brought the brothers closer. Whereas Karl held that the
Hungarian revolution was of great significance because it had torn Hun-
gary from its feudal hangovers, Michael set the events in the context of his
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theory of knowledge and anti-totalitarian social theory, in which he reas-
serted the need for “spiritual beliefs” in truth, in fairness and decency, in
beauty, in solidarity, and in justice.12  On this ground, Michael, more than
Karl, maintained that science, arts, religion, and jurisprudence, while be-
ing fields of independent thought, are yet allied to each other. If the inde-
pendence of one is taken away, then the freedom of others likewise will
be ended. Considering this position Harry Prosch points out: “the ultimate
(result) of Polanyi’s (Michael’s) efforts was to reinforce our traditional
beliefs in truth, justice, mercy and fellowship…for the continued existence
of a free society…. This will lend an ontological basis for man’s grasp of
his own dignity and high calling in the universe”.13 Through his emphasis
on spiritual beliefs, Michael moved away from the socialist spirit of his
own family and began to move toward the examination of the responsible
person in a free society.
3.  Polanyi and Gestalt Psychology
Polanyi offered his life to inquire human knowledge in which he
published Science, Faith and Society (1946), Personal Knowledge
(1958) and The Tacit Dimension (1966). His approach in those books
was a fresh one. Having rejected the positivistic notion of knowledge he
looks for a true epistemology which would constitute a totally new philo-
sophical beginning: tacit knowing. While his opponents, the positivists,
have a long time been attempting to derive the wholes from parts, in a very
explicit way, by identifying the parts and describing their mutual relation,
Polanyi turns to a position that says we know more the whole reality
although we cannot specify it. He explains that any attempt to specify the
particulars of the whole remains incomplete. In one way, there is always a
residue of particulars left unspecified; and in another way, even when par-
ticulars can be identified, isolation of the particulars can change their ap-
pearance. Polanyi, then, says that knowing is a process of comprehend-
ing: a grasping of disjoined parts into a comprehensive whole.14 The mu-
tual relationship between particulars can be grasped only by a sustained
effort of imagination.
In any event this position has been developed by Gestalt psy-
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chologists who had amassed in their attempts to show that we see objects
by supplying forms or patterns in terms of which the various bits and
pieces in our perceptual field tend to fall into meaningful place. It seems to
be clear from some of their experiments that we do not perceive objects
by inferring them from their given parts, nor by a process of induction.
Polanyi’s references to Gestalt psychology occurred for the first
time in his article in 1941: “The Growth of Thought in Society”,15 when he
was still struggling with the freedom of science and drew upon the ideas of
Gestalt to argue for decentralized control. He contends that there is more
than one form of order besides a predetermined one given by centralized
scientific planning. From the work of Wolfgang Kohler,16 Polanyi shows
that there can be an order of the highest complexity spontaneously achieved
by internal mutual adjustment. His interest in Gestalt psychology’s findings
in relation to creative intellectual endeavor becomes the foundation of his
major new insight.
Besides Gestalt psychology’s importance in the context of the
freedom of Science, Polanyi also saw its importance in his discussion of
knowledge generation. This can be found for the first time in his book
Science, Faith and Society, when Polanyi concentrates on the problem
of scientific discovery. He acknowledges that his reflection on the role of
scientific intuition in the process of scientific discovery is “akin to the rec-
ognition of shapes as analyzed by Gestalt psychology”.17  The Gestalt
psychology assumed that the perception of shapes is caused by the spon-
taneous reorganization of the physical traces made by sense __ impres-
sions inside our sense-organs. The capacity of scientists to guess the pres-
ence of shapes as tokens of reality does not essentially differ from the
capacity of our ordinary perception to establish the reality of things around
us. In Personal Knowledge Polanyi says that the finding of Gestalt psy-
chology was his first clue to his concept of tacit knowing. He clarifies:
“Scientists have run away from the philosophic implications of Gestalt; I
want to countenance them uncompromisingly”.18 The importance of Ge-
stalt psychology for Polanyi, therefore, lies in its thesis that “we may know
a physiognomy by integrating our awareness of its particulars without be-
ing able to identify these particulars”.19
For Polanyi, Gestalt psychology was response against the atomic
sensationalist theories of the nineteenth century which contended that sen-
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sory experience is the basis of all human knowing. In this controversy with
atomic sensationalism, the Gestalt theoreticians promoted a thesis that
derives from its name: the Gestalt, the whole. In the formulation of Kurt
Koffka they seemed to say: “The word Gestalt has the meaning of a con-
crete individual and characteristic entity, existing as something detached
and having a shape or form as one of its attributes. A Gestalt, therefore, is
a product of organization, [and] organization the process that leads to a
Gestalt”.20 In the process of organization what happens to a part of the
whole is determined by intrinsic laws inherent in this whole. All particulars
become meaningless if we lose sight of the pattern which they jointly con-
stitute.
Polanyi knows that Gestalt psychology tends to treat perception
and knowledge as a more or less passive affair and therefore failed to see
perception as a construction, in which we create a tacit integration of
sensations and feelings into a perceived object. “Such an interpretation”,
Polanyi says, “leaves no place for any intentional effort which prompts our
perception to explore and assess in the quest of knowledge the clues
offered to our senses”.21 Despite this critical defect Polanyi acknowledges
that his theory of knowledge uses some proofs from Gestalt psychology.
He says that Gestalt psychology has pushed him to build a kind of phe-
nomenology of knowledge. In this standpoint Polanyi formulates his am-
biguous attitude toward Gestalt psychology. He writes, “Yet my evalua-
tion of this material is so different from that of Gestalt theory, that I shall
prefer not to refer here to this theory, even though I shall continue to draw
on its domain and pursue some arguments on lines closely parallel to that
of its teachings”.22 With this attitude Polanyi promotes his own view on the
nature of knowledge using some data from Gestalt psychology.
4.  The Subsidiary Awareness and the Focal Awareness
In the preface to his major book Personal Knowledge Polanyi
writes his epistemological position:
I regard knowing as an active comprehension of the
things known, an action that requires skill. Skilful know-
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ing and doing is performed by subordinating a set of par-
ticulars, as clues or tools, to shaping of a skilful achieve-
ment, whether practical or theoretical. We may then be
said to become subsidiarily aware of these particulars
within our focal awareness of the coherent entity that we
achieve.23
According to this epistemological encapsulation, the foundation
of knowing lies in the distinction between focal awareness and subsidiary
awareness. Focal awareness is an awareness of an object as our focus of
attention, while subsidiary awareness is an awareness of an object as a
clue to another.
His departure point of this thesis is the observation of the relation
of a set of particulars to a comprehensive entity in several kinds of know-
ing, namely, the understanding of physiognomy, the performance of skills,
and the mastery of tools and probes. In all these cases, Polanyi finds that
we can be aware of something in two mutually exclusive ways. “We can”,
he says, “be aware of particulars uncomprehendingly, i.e., in themselves,
or understandingly, in their participation in a comprehensive entity”.24  In
the first case we focus our attention on the isolated particulars and then
are aware of the particulars focally. But in the second, our attention is
directed beyond them to the entity to which they contribute; we notice
them subsidiarily in terms of their participation in the whole. Focal aware-
ness and subsidiary awareness, therefore, are definitely not two degrees
of attention but two kinds of attention given to the same particulars.
The critical factor distinguishing the two types of knowledge, how-
ever, lies not only in the content but primarily in the logical function of the
subsidiary elements. The subsidiary elements function as clues to enable
the knower to form a consistent perceptual or conceptual image of an
object being considered. Therefore, to clarify what he means by subsid-
iary awareness and focal awareness Polanyi gives more attention to the
evidences that are the results of the organization of sensory clues. In this
case Polanyi attempts to clarify that to see object is the result of learning a
skill, of learning how to attain a meaningful (but non-explicit) integration of
sensory clues.
To explain this Polanyi follows an exposition of the fact which had
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been demonstrated by Gestalt psychology, namely, what happens “when
I move my hand before my eyes”.25 So far as immediate givens are con-
cerned, I should only see my hand constantly changing its color, its size,
and its shape. But instead it appears that I informally “take into account a
host of rapidly changing clues, some in the field of vision, some in my eye
muscles and some deeper still in my body, as in the labyrinth of the inner
ear”,26 and so what I really perceive turns out to be a coherence among
these thousand varied and changing clues in the form of a single unchang-
ing object moving about, and therefore tacitly understood, in my percep-
tion, as being seen from continually different angles and distances and
under variable illuminations. But it is apparent that this coherence could
have been accomplished only tacitly, since I could not have been explicitly
aware at the moment of some of the clues that apparently have entered
into my coherent perception, those provided by my eye muscles, labyrinth
organ, etc.
Through this example Polanyi makes clear two points concerning
the distinction of subsidiary awareness and focal awareness. In one point
he says that one does not need to be consciously aware of all the clues he
integrates into a perception. With respect to this point Polanyi holds that
the physiologists have long ago established that the way we see an object
is determined by our awareness of certain efforts inside our body, some
efforts that we cannot feel in themselves. They proved that “we are aware
of these things going on inside our body in terms of the position, size,
shape, and motion of an object to which we are attending”.27
In the second point, Polanyi adds, it is also apparent that there
must exist a perceptual action enabling me to pick out “objects” from my
visual field and to retain them as integrated wholes even when their sense
quality changes. I perceive them to be entities in motion retaining their
integrity as objects, instead of perceiving them to be changing their char-
acter as objects. Given such a mechanism to start with, I could then learn
the skill of using it in more and more adequate ways as time went on.
With this analysis of the distinction of subsidiary awareness and
focal awareness we can conclude that knowledge is an activity which
would be better described as a process of knowing. It is tacit because all
the clues and particulars which are at work in our visual perception and
the use of tools and probes are unspecifiable. It is an experience that we
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have of our bodies and of our mental act as our own. But it is also a
consciousness of the intentional terms projected as externally distanced
whole, forms, objects, skills and more generally meanings, when forms,
objects, skills, and meanings are the object of our focal awareness. Know-
ing, therefore, involves the objective pole upon which subjective opera-
tion may be said to focus, but it also necessarily involves a non-focal
substratum experience and performance. It contains “components of which
we are subsidiarily aware in the focal content of our thinking, and that all
thought dwells in its subsidiaries, as if they were parts of our body”.28  No
knowledge, therefore, is wholly focal.
5.  The Subsidiaries
The remarkable thing of Polanyi’s theory of knowledge is that the
appearance of a thing at the centre of our knowing depends on clues to
which I am not directly attending. In the case of perception, there must be
certain sensory clues essential to what I am seeing, of which I am not
focally aware. The question arises as to what is the subsidiary? How can
it operate in our knowledge?
Categorically, the non-focal clues or better the subsidiary clues
must be of two kinds:29 (1) There are those clues which Polanyi called
subliminal: those events in my body, such as eye-muscles movements,
movements inside my labyrinth organ, and neural traces in my cortex that
I cannot ever directly perceive as part of my visual field when they are
functioning in an act of perception. But (2) there are also clues that I do
see, but only from the corner of my eyes. These clues he called "marginal
clues." I can observe directly these clues if I choose, but it is obvious I do
not attend to them directly when I am viewing an object focally. I merely
attend from them to a focal object. Thus my awareness of both kinds of
these clues must only be subsidiary to my focal awareness of an object.
The marginal clues can also be broken down into two kinds. Be-
sides what we see “at the corner of our eye:”, there is another type of
clues which also functions marginally in perception, that is, the way we
have been used to seeing in the past. Perception is contextual and histori-
cally conditioned and what we see is often a function of what we have
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learned to see. It is a habituation. Polanyi in this case explains that if we
irresistibly see a room as having a normal shape that is because of another
act of tacit knowing involving a subsidiary awareness at the back of our
mind of a great many normal rooms that we have seen in the past.30  So,
not only what is at the corner of our eyes, but also what is at the back of
our mind that functions as a background in perception. The weight of
these memories at the back of our mind functions as a marginal clue, as
part of a background upon which we see the objects. This background, in
Polanyi’s thought, is so important for the perception of objects because it,
like a landscape, includes an infinite range of particulars to which we are
paying no special attention, but nevertheless makes it possible to see, for
example, a cow strolling in a field. Polanyi seems to mean that since the
background fills up the field of our vision, it strikes us perceptually as
unlimited in its extent, i.e., as infinite. And because what fills up our field of
vision cannot be seen to be moving against a further background, it has to
appear to us to be at absolute rest.
With this concept Polanyi appears to be holding that the concep-
tions and general notions we have formed on the basis of the past experi-
ence enter only tacitly and as further specifications of what already has
become our perceptual background by the operation of our visual mecha-
nisms. The Humean notion that our past experiences automatically condi-
tion us to feel certain expectations for the future must therefore be in error
from Polanyi’s point of view. From what Polanyi says, it would seem to
mean that our cognitive expectations, or what Dewey called our “funded
experience” are not effective in determining the background in perception
when our visual mechanisms provide us with a background that contra-
dicts this funded experience, our knowledge.31
Harry Prosch also informs that “as for our tendency to integrate
some of our sensory fields into stable objects in the first place __ objects
that retain their integrity while moving against a stationary background -
Polanyi rejects references to ‘equilibrations’ in our nervous systems, or to
any other sort of automatic nervous mechanisms”.32  It seems to him,
Polanyi holds rather that this tendency to integrate some of our sensory
field into stable objects comes from our “craving to find strands of perma-
nence in the tumult of changing appearances”, which “is the supreme or-
ganon for bringing our experiences under intellectual control”.33  We should
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note here that for Polanyi, an intention to bring “our experiences under
intellectual control” begins to operate already in basic perception, so that
even the basic mechanisms of visual perception are held by him to be
teleologically oriented toward the attainment of an intended intellectual
coherence. Physiological mechanisms themselves are therefore thought
by him to be structured to function toward the goal of attaining meaning,
although functioning only mechanically toward such a goal, not deliber-
ately. Thus, they sometimes present us with illusions, i.e., are in error.
Yet, in spite of the mechanical operation of basic perceptual mecha-
nisms, Polanyi holds that our perceptions are not heteronomously caused.
Rather, he maintains, “we are performing one single mental act in jointly
seeing an object against its background”. Such a mental act has a focus in
terms of which the background functions in a subsidiary way, and so “we
are aware of the background only in terms of the object’s appearance __
e.g., of its being in motion”.34 He holds that both focal awareness and
subsidiary awareness exist functionally related in a single, purposive act of
mental awareness. But since we cannot discover in our consciousness all
the subsidiary clues that we integrate into a perceived object (we admit-
tedly are unable to infer the object explicitly from all our consciously known
sense data), Polanyi’s contention is that a perception as a single mental act
must rest upon a reiterated supposition that some physiological events in
our body that we can never take note of focally by means of introspection
are nevertheless elements used by us in a subsidiary way in structuring an
integrated object of focal perception - and are not simply causes of such
integration. In other words, he holds that subsidiary awareness may func-
tion at all levels of consciousness from the subliminal to the fully conscious
__ that some “functions inside our body at levels completely inaccessible
to experience by the subject” are elements of which we take account in
the total economy of our awareness.35 We truly do, therefore, “know
more than we can tell”.36
With the clarification of the nature and the status of the subsidiar-
ies Polanyi, then, says that the act of knowing involves an intentional change
of being: the pouring of ourselves into the subsidiary awareness of par-
ticulars which function as the elements of the observed comprehensive
whole. Polanyi calls his theory of knowledge tacit knowing or the tacit
dimension because the grounds of all knowing are subsidiary, or tacit com-
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ponents, items or particulars. Tacit knowing, then, although an intentional
act, is one in which we are only in subsidiary fashion.
6.  Tacit Knowledge: Its Role in Business
Polanyi’s theory of tacit knowing reached its highest development
in 1966, when he published The Tacit Dimension. In this publication,
Polanyi defends his position that science is an art of knowing that is devel-
oped according to the principle of spontaneous coordination of indepen-
dent initiatives under the criterion of plausibility, scientific values and origi-
nality.37 Both the criteria of plausibility and of scientific value tend to en-
force conformity, while the value attached to originality encourages dis-
sent among scientists. All these criteria are tacit dimensions.
Thirty years later Ikujiro Nonaka and Hirotaka Takeuchi applied
this theory in business. The resulting book is entitled The Knowledge-
Creating Company. The book is not so much one of philosophical re-
flection, but a management book that focuses on the problem of knowl-
edge creation in Japanese companies. As suggested in the title of the book,
Nonaka and Takeuchi were attempting to show that the success of Japa-
nese companies is due to knowledge creation. Following Peter Drucker,
Alvin Toffler, James Brian Quinn and Robert Reich, Nonaka and Takeuchi
agree that “the economic and producing power of a modern corporation
lies more in its intellectual and service capabilities than in its hard assets,
such as land, plant, and equipment”.38 Knowledge creation, then, be-
comes the new competitive resource in business. But the questions arise
as to what kind of knowledge the Japanese opt to create? Which knowl-
edge is more preferable? How could this kind of knowledge be devel-
oped?
It takes for granted in management that a good organization is one
which has the capability to process explicit knowledge. Nonaka and
Takeuchi describe this kind of knowledge as formal and systematic, can
be expressed in words and numbers, and can be easily communicated
and shared in the form of hard data, scientific formulae, and codified pro-
cedures. This concept, however, is very different from implicit knowledge
as understood by Japanese companies. This kind of knowledge is prima-
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rily tacit, something not easily visible and expressible, includes subjective
insights, intuitions, and hunches and is deeply rooted in an individual's
action and experience, as well as in the ideals, values, or emotions he or
she embraces.39
In Polanyi’s perspective this kind of knowledge consists of two
kinds of subsidiaries. The first is the technical dimension, which encom-
passes the kind of informal and hard-to-pin-down skills or crafts cap-
tured in the term knowing how. Like a master of craftsman, the Japanese
managers develop a wealth of expertise at his fingertips after years of
experience. This kind of knowledge is hard to be articulated in words.
The second is the cognitive dimension. It consists of schemata, mental
models, beliefs, and perceptions so ingrained that we take them for granted.
This aspect of tacit knowledge reflects our image of reality and our vision
of the future. Though they cannot be articulated, these implicit models
shape the way we perceive the world around us. This aspect of tacit
knowledge contains also our knowledge of the history of a company and
the way how this company looks for solutions in facing its problem.
According to Nonaka and Takeuchi, this vision of knowledge has
its roots in the Japanese intellectual tradition influenced by Buddhism and
Confucianism. According to these traditions, the Japanese perception is
oriented toward objects in nature that are subtle, but, at the same time,
visual and concrete. Knowledge does not mean to grasp the objects, but
includes the way of being to participate in the way of other being. It means
knowledge includes wisdom that is the way of being to discover the real-
ity. If Western philosophy is dominated by Cartesian dualism between
subject and object, mind and body, or mind and matter, the Japanese
intellectual tradition is concerned with the idea of oneness of humanity and
nature,40 oneness of body and mind,41 and oneness of self and other.42 In
the context of such a tradition, it can be thought that almost all of the highly
visionary knowledge of the top president of a Japanese company consists
of subjective insight, intuitions, and hunches. This kind of knowledge can-
not be easily processed in a mechanical way (like a computer creating a
database). One should dwell in it and have a feeling to what they have in
mind. Like a child who learns things with his body, not only by his mind, to
understand the implicit knowledge of the top president one should delve
into history, into the way the company is organized, and even into the
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speech that is spoken in the ceremonial events of company.
With this concept in mind, Nonaka and Takeuchi anticipate that in
business it is not the thing that we have knowledge of, but how we create
knowledge: “Once the importance of tacit knowledge is realized, then one
begins to think about innovation in a whole new way”.43  They explain that
in business, knowledge is not just about putting together diverse bits of
data and information. It is a highly individual process of personal and
organizational self-renewal. In Polanyi words, the task of management is
searching the way to discovery or innovation.44 In such pursuit “we are
guided by sensing the presence of a hidden reality toward which our clues
are pointing; and the discovery which terminates and satisfies this pursuit
is still sustained by the same vision”.45 The essence of innovation is to re-
create the world according to a particular vision. This means to create the
company and everyone in it in an ongoing process of personal and orga-
nizational self-renewal.46
To have an insight that is highly personal is of little value to the
company unless the individual can convert it into explicit knowledge, thus
allowing it to be shared with others in the company. Nonaka and Takeuchi
tell us that Japanese companies are especially good at realizing this transi-
tion from tacit knowledge to explicit knowledge. They take Honda as a
case. Before 1975 Honda produced sedan which has a large and long
body. The prototype of this product is Honda Civic and Honda Accord.
In 1978, Hiro Watanabe, the top management at Honda, inaugurated the
development of a new-concept car with the slogan, ‘Let’s gamble’ which
received a positive response from the young engineers and designers (the
average age was 27). Mr. Watanabe only had a vision that the revolution-
ary car should be called ‘tall boy’ with ‘man-maximum, machine mini-
mum’ principle. The mission might sound vague, but in fact it provided the
team with an extremely clear sense of direction. The result was called
“Honda City”.
From this example Nonaka and Tekeuchi explain that the tacit
knowledge is not a solitary fact. It can be understood because it can be
made explicit in three ways.47 First, it can be expressed in figurative or
metaphorical language. A metaphor such as “automobile evolution” “man-
maximum, machine-minimum”, “tall boy” is a distinctive method percep-
tion. It is a way for individuals grounded in different contexts and with
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different experiences to understand something intuitively through the use
of imagination and symbols, both metaphor and analogy.  Through meta-
phors, people put together what they know but cannot yet say. As such,
metaphor is highly effective if fostering direct commitment to the creative
process in the early stages of knowledge creation.
Second, it can be disseminated into team work. The story of
Honda City suggests how new knowledge always starts with an individual
__ Mr. Hiroo Watanabe in this case __ and how an individual’s personal
knowledge is transformed into organizational knowledge valuable to the
company as a whole. In this case the organization cannot create knowl-
edge on its own without the initiative of the individual and the interaction
that takes place within the group. Knowledge can be amplified at the
group level through dialogue, discussion, experience sharing, and obser-
vation.
Third, although it can be expressed, implicit knowledge is born in
the midst of ambiguity and redundancy. The story of the Honda City sug-
gests how certain organizational conditions can enhance the knowledge-
creation process. It may sound paradoxical, but the confusion created
within the product development team by the ambiguity of the mission
handed down by Honda’s top management provided an extremely clear
sense of direction to the team. Ambiguity can prove useful at times not
only as a source of a new sense of direction, but also as a source of
alternate meanings and a fresh way of thinking about things. It also invites
redundancy. To Western managers, redundancy has connotation of un-
necessary duplication and waste. Yet, in case of Honda City, redundancy
is important because it encourages frequent dialogue and communication.
This helps create a common cognitive ground among employees and thus
facilitates the transfer of tacit knowledge.
7.  Closing Remarks
“Knowledge is an important factor in economic phenomena”. This
is one of the basic thoughts of neoclassical economics and has been taken
for granted by many contemporary scholars such as Marshall, Hayek and
Schumpeter. But what is important here is the way knowledge is treated.
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This depends upon the emphasis we put on knowledge, the type of knowl-
edge to which attention is paid, and the ways we acquire and utilize it.
What needs to be recognized is the fact that not all knowledge is explicit.
The greater part of knowledge is still implicit and can only be expressed in
figurative ways.
Looking at the way it is produced and communicated; two things
concerning tacit knowing can be deduced in these closing remarks. First,
tacit knowing is social-psychological fact, in a sense that it is based on
personal or national experiences of things. Human beings acquire knowl-
edge by actively creating and organizing their experiences. Being different
from traditional epistemology that derives knowledge from the separation
of the subject and object of perception, we contend that human beings
create knowledge by involving themselves with objects. Polanyi calls this
process ‘indwelling’.
Two, tacit knowing is an ontological fact, in a sense that tacit
knowing presents different worldviews: the individual world and the orga-
nizational world. Tacit knowing suggests that at first stage knowledge is
created only by individuals. An organization cannot create knowledge
without individuals. The organization supports creative individuals or pro-
vides contexts for them to create knowledge. Organizational knowledge
creation, therefore, should be understood as a process that organization-
ally amplifies the knowledge created by individuals and crystallizes it as
part of the knowledge network of organization. This process takes place
within an expanding community of interaction, which crosses inter-organi-
zational level and boundaries. My knowledge, then, means my world,
because only through my knowledge do I dwell in my world. With this
perspective, I can say that a company is not only a neutral organization,
but a knowledge-sharing organization. It is not determined by its goal, but
by its basis, which is the process of sharing-knowledge of those who
dwell in a common tradition.
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